Comments on: Becker and Posner on “Libertarian Paternalism” http://www.truthonthemarket.com/2007/01/15/becker-and-posner-on-libertarian-paternalism/ Academic commentary on law, business, economics and more Thu, 18 Mar 2010 20:05:20 -0700 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.5 hourly 1 By: TRUTH ON THE MARKET » Rizzo and Whitman on Paternalist Slopes http://www.truthonthemarket.com/2007/01/15/becker-and-posner-on-libertarian-paternalism/comment-page-1/#comment-61882 TRUTH ON THE MARKET » Rizzo and Whitman on Paternalist Slopes Fri, 02 Feb 2007 19:20:20 +0000 http://www.truthonthemarket.com/2007/01/15/becker-and-posner-on-libertarian-paternalism/#comment-61882 [...] Libertarian paternalism, behavioral law and economics, and “soft” paternalism are topics of discussion here on TOTM from time to time (see, e.g. here, here, and here).  Two very good economists who think about these problems quite a bit, Mario Rizzo (NYU) and Glen Whitman (Agoraphilia, CSUN), have posted their paper “Paternalist Slopes.”  I had the pleasure of meeting Rizzo and Whitman at the New York University Journal of Law and Liberty Symposium on Behavioral Economics and Classical Liberalism where they were discussing this paper.  It is an excellent read for those interested in these issues. Here’s the abstract: A growing literature in law and public policy harnesses research in behavioral economics to justify a new form of paternalism. Contributors to this literature typically emphasize the modest, non-intrusive character of their proposals. A distinct literature in law and public policy analyzes the validity of “slippery slope” arguments. Contributors to this literature have identified various mechanisms and processes by which slippery slopes operate, as well as the circumstances in which the threat of such slopes is greatest. The present article sits at the nexus of the new paternalist literature and the slippery slopes literature. We argue that the new paternalism exhibits many characteristics identified by the slopes literature as conducive to slippery slopes. Specifically, the new paternalism exhibits considerable theoretical and empirical vagueness, making it vulnerable to slopes resulting from altered economic incentives, enforcement needs, deference to perceived authority, bias toward simple principles, and reframing of the status quo. These slope processes are especially likely when decisionmakers are subject to cognitive biases – as the new paternalists insist they are. Consequently, soft paternalism can pave the way for harder paternalism. We conclude that policymaking based on new paternalist reasoning should be considered with greater trepidation than its advocates have suggested. [...] [...] Libertarian paternalism, behavioral law and economics, and “soft” paternalism are topics of discussion here on TOTM from time to time (see, e.g. here, here, and here).  Two very good economists who think about these problems quite a bit, Mario Rizzo (NYU) and Glen Whitman (Agoraphilia, CSUN), have posted their paper “Paternalist Slopes.”  I had the pleasure of meeting Rizzo and Whitman at the New York University Journal of Law and Liberty Symposium on Behavioral Economics and Classical Liberalism where they were discussing this paper.  It is an excellent read for those interested in these issues. Here’s the abstract: A growing literature in law and public policy harnesses research in behavioral economics to justify a new form of paternalism. Contributors to this literature typically emphasize the modest, non-intrusive character of their proposals. A distinct literature in law and public policy analyzes the validity of “slippery slope” arguments. Contributors to this literature have identified various mechanisms and processes by which slippery slopes operate, as well as the circumstances in which the threat of such slopes is greatest. The present article sits at the nexus of the new paternalist literature and the slippery slopes literature. We argue that the new paternalism exhibits many characteristics identified by the slopes literature as conducive to slippery slopes. Specifically, the new paternalism exhibits considerable theoretical and empirical vagueness, making it vulnerable to slopes resulting from altered economic incentives, enforcement needs, deference to perceived authority, bias toward simple principles, and reframing of the status quo. These slope processes are especially likely when decisionmakers are subject to cognitive biases – as the new paternalists insist they are. Consequently, soft paternalism can pave the way for harder paternalism. We conclude that policymaking based on new paternalist reasoning should be considered with greater trepidation than its advocates have suggested. [...]

]]> By: M. Hodak http://www.truthonthemarket.com/2007/01/15/becker-and-posner-on-libertarian-paternalism/comment-page-1/#comment-53862 M. Hodak Wed, 17 Jan 2007 19:18:31 +0000 http://www.truthonthemarket.com/2007/01/15/becker-and-posner-on-libertarian-paternalism/#comment-53862 Professor Posner is basically advocating that "rule by experts" is efficient. This is good, old-fashioned paternalism. From my archive of quaint political quotes: "Housewives on the whole cannot be trusted to buy all the right things where nutrition and health care are concerned. This is really no more than an extension of the principle according to which the housewife herself would not trust a child of four to select the week's purchases. For in the case of nutrition and health, just as in the case of education, the gentleman in Whitehall really does know better what is good for people than the people know themselves." - Douglas Jay, a British MP and intellectual influence of the Labour government of the 1940s Professor Posner is basically advocating that “rule by experts” is efficient. This is good, old-fashioned paternalism.

From my archive of quaint political quotes:

“Housewives on the whole cannot be trusted to buy all the right things where nutrition and health care are concerned. This is really no more than an extension of the principle according to which the housewife herself would not trust a child of four to select the week’s purchases. For in the case of nutrition and health, just as in the case of education, the gentleman in Whitehall really does know better what is good for people than the people know themselves.”

- Douglas Jay, a British MP and intellectual influence of the Labour government of the 1940s

]]> By: The Volokh Conspiracy http://www.truthonthemarket.com/2007/01/15/becker-and-posner-on-libertarian-paternalism/comment-page-1/#comment-53665 The Volokh Conspiracy Wed, 17 Jan 2007 13:36:02 +0000 http://www.truthonthemarket.com/2007/01/15/becker-and-posner-on-libertarian-paternalism/#comment-53665 <strong>Wright on "Libertarian Paternalism":...</strong> GMU law professor Joshua Wright takes sides in the Posner-Becker dialogue over libertarian paterianlism. ...... Wright on “Libertarian Paternalism”:…

GMU law professor Joshua Wright takes sides in the Posner-Becker dialogue over libertarian paterianlism.

……

]]> By: Jon http://www.truthonthemarket.com/2007/01/15/becker-and-posner-on-libertarian-paternalism/comment-page-1/#comment-53354 Jon Tue, 16 Jan 2007 21:20:16 +0000 http://www.truthonthemarket.com/2007/01/15/becker-and-posner-on-libertarian-paternalism/#comment-53354 In our paper, Mitchell and I lay out the framework for determining the costs and benefits of a paternalistic intervention. It's pretty simple stuff (arguably, only the moral/cognitive hazard point [i.e., dynamic effects of intervention on behavior] is particularly innovative), but it's kind of shocking that essentially no one in the behavioral law and econ literature even attempts this kind of benefit-cost analysis when advocating a reform premised on some "bias." When I ask people making these kinds of proposals whether their reform would pass such a test, the answer always comes back as some version of "well, the testing required to estimate these parameters would be hard [some even suggest that testing would be impossible in their area because data don't exist] and we need to do something in the meantime to address these biases." In our paper, Mitchell and I lay out the framework for determining the costs and benefits of a paternalistic intervention. It’s pretty simple stuff (arguably, only the moral/cognitive hazard point [i.e., dynamic effects of intervention on behavior] is particularly innovative), but it’s kind of shocking that essentially no one in the behavioral law and econ literature even attempts this kind of benefit-cost analysis when advocating a reform premised on some “bias.” When I ask people making these kinds of proposals whether their reform would pass such a test, the answer always comes back as some version of “well, the testing required to estimate these parameters would be hard [some even suggest that testing would be impossible in their area because data don't exist] and we need to do something in the meantime to address these biases.”

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